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Savings and assets can cushion families
against sudden income losses and can bol-
ster long-term economic gains. Assets,
however, can make a low-income family
ineligible for benefits from means-tested
programs when they encounter economic
difficulties. Most means-tested programs
restrict eligibility to families with assets
that fall below a set threshold in an effort to
target benefits only to those most in need.
However, if asset restrictions unintention-
ally discourage low-income families from
saving, asset tests may run counter to the
often-cited government goal of promoting
self-sufficiency.
In recent years, federal and state gov-
ernments have implemented programs 
and amended program rules to encourage
savings and thus promote self-sufficiency
among low-income families. For example,
the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program and the Food
Stamp Program (FSP) now allow states to
ease asset rules. These changes were aimed
at lifting restrictions on vehicle ownership
and the value of liquid assets (e.g., dollars
held in savings or checking accounts). Some
states further liberalized asset tests by creat-
ing separate limits for restricted accounts;
restricted accounts are savings accounts ear-
marked for specific purposes such as indi-
vidual development accounts, retirement
savings accounts (e.g., 401(k)), and educa-
tion savings plans (e.g., 529 plans), among
others. Withdrawals from restricted ac-
counts are limited to certain activities, such
as retirement, education, homeownership,
or business start-up. 
In addition to these liberalizations, fed-
eral and state governments have been sup-
porting Individual Development Account
(IDA) programs. IDAs are restricted savings
accounts that provide matching funds at the
time of withdrawal (i.e., matched with-
drawals), if savings will be used for one of a
few preset goals (e.g., higher education,
homeownership, or business start-up).
Other government programs and policies
aimed more broadly at low-income families
can also affect asset accumulation. Both the
earned income tax credit (EITC) and the
minimum wage, for example, are aimed at
raising the incomes of low-income families,
which in turn can affect their asset building. 
Despite the potential importance of
these government programs and policy
changes, few studies have examined rules
that can affect saving and asset accumula-
tion among low-income families. So far,
the research shows mixed results. Of four
empirical studies that examine the effect
of the asset rules in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram and its successor, the TANF cash
assistance program, two studies find that
relaxing AFDC/TANF program rules did
not increase households’ liquid asset hold-
ings or net worth (Hurst and Ziliak 2006;
Sullivan 2006), while two others find that
they did increase households’ liquid asset
holdings (Nam 2008) or net worth (Powers
1998). The research on the effect of
AFDC/TANF rules on vehicle ownership
is also mixed. Sullivan (2006) and Hurst
and Ziliak (2006) find evidence that relax-
ing asset limits leads to higher vehicle
ownership, while Nam (2008) finds no evi-
dence that vehicle ownership increases
when asset limits are relaxed. Findings on
the relationship between IDA programs
and asset holdings are more consistent
and provide evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between IDA programs and asset
accumulation (Schreiner et al. 2005; U.S.
Department of Health and Human
Services 2004; Stegman and Faris 2005;
Mills et al. 2006).
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This study adds to the literature
by examining the relationship be-
tween asset building and 13 specific
program rules and policies (box 1).
It answers the following research
questions for two populations—low-
education (high school degree or less)
single-mother families and all low-
education families:
 What is the relationship between
specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA,
or EITC program rules and mini-
mum wage requirements and
 liquid asset holdings? 
 vehicle asset holdings? 
 net worth? 
The analysis spans from 1991
through 2003, a time of significant
change for the TANF and Food Stamp
programs, as well as the introduction
of IDA programs. This period also
captures asset holdings during weak
and strong economic times. 
How Can Asset Tests and
Asset-Building Programs
Affect Asset Holdings?
State means-tested social program
rules can affect asset holdings
through four hypothesized effects:
the asset test effect, precautionary
savings effect, income effect, and sub-
stitution effect. These effects are dis-
cussed in turn below.
Asset Test Effect: Asset tests in
means-tested programs restrict the
level of assets families can have and
still receive benefits, which can dis-
courage low-income families from
accumulating financial assets. Fam-
ilies may spend down or keep their
financial assets below asset limits to
remain eligible for income transfer
programs. Accordingly, asset tests 
are hypothesized to lower the asset
holdings of current and potential
program participants (Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Neumark
and Powers 1998). 
Precautionary Savings Effect:
Means-tested programs provide
benefits to families during economic
emergencies, thereby providing a
minimum level of consumption (a
consumption floor). The consumption
floor in means-tested transfer pro-
grams is expected to reduce precau-
tionary savings (Hubbard et al. 1995).
That is, the availability of income
from the government is expected to
reduce families’ need to save for sud-
den economic loss (e.g., losing a job
or incurring unexpected medical
costs) and, therefore, is hypothesized
to lower saving rates among current
and potential program beneficiaries.
Box 1.  Program Rule Variable Definitions
Program rule variable
AFDC/TANF
(1) Unrestricted asset limit
(2) Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle
(3) Restricted account asset limit
(4) Maximum monthly benefit for family of three
Food Stamp Program (FSP)
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle
(2) Expanded categorical eligibility
Individual Development Account (IDA)
(1) Maximum match rate
(2) Maximum amount qualified for match
(3) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients
Minimum wage and earned income tax credit (EITC)
(1) State EITC
(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable
(3) Minimum wage for FLSA-covered categories
(4) Minimum wage for non-FLSA-covered categories
Description
Dollar value of assets a family may hold and be eligible for welfare
At least one vehicle per unit exempt from asset limit
Dollar value of assets earmarked for specific purposes (e.g., education)
excluded from asset limits
Maximum monthly benefit for a family of three
At least one vehicle per unit exempt from asset limit
State uses expanded categorical eligibility
Number of dollars a state will contribute to a family’s IDA account for
every dollar the family contributes
Maximum amount a state will match in an IDA account
IDA participants not required to be welfare participants
The maximum EITC offered by the state
Percentage of the state EITC that is refundable
Higher of the state or federal minimum wage
State minimum wage for non-federally covered categories
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Income Effect: Means-tested pro-
grams provide families with addi-
tional income, such as benefits and
program matches, that could be used
to increase savings. Families could
choose to increase their consumption
by the full amount of the benefit or
distribute their benefit between in-
creased consumption and increased
savings. Thus, the benefits provided
by social programs can increase asset
holdings.
Substitution Effect: Measuring
families’ asset holdings is compli-
cated by the fact that families can
shift their asset holdings. Program
rules that affect only specific types of
asset holdings could encourage fami-
lies to substitute one type of asset for
another type. For example, more 
generous vehicle asset exemptions
could lead families to use their sav-
ings (i.e., lower liquid assets) to pur-
chase a vehicle (i.e., increase vehicle
assets). This shifting of assets is
important for understanding how
program rules affect assets.
The program rules identified
above can affect asset holdings
through more than one of these
mechanisms. Given these potentially
offsetting effects, it is not clear with-
out turning to the data whether
social program rules increase or




Both the federal and state govern-
ments introduced asset-building
policies for low-income households
during the 1990s. The Family Support
Act of 1988 permitted states to apply
to the federal government for waivers
to raise AFDC asset limits. Without a
federal waiver, states could not raise
these limits above the federal limits 
of $1,000 on liquid assets and $1,500
on vehicle assets (Powers 1998). The
1996 welfare reform legislation,
which replaced AFDC with TANF,
abolished the federal asset limits for
welfare, allowing states to create their
own limits (Savner and Greenberg
1995; Corporation for Enterprise
Development 2002). 
Taking advantage of the federal
policy changes, many states increased
AFDC/TANF limits imposed on liq-
uid assets in unrestricted accounts
and vehicle assets. Between 1993
and 2003, unrestricted asset limits
more than doubled in real terms
(from an average of $1,139 to
$2,587), and 25 states implemented
policies to exempt at least one 
vehicle when determining program
eligibility (Nam, Ratcliffe, and
McKernan 2008). States also began
creating separate asset limits for
restricted savings accounts, such as
IDAs, education, and retirement
accounts. Restricted accounts have
separate and higher asset limits than
unrestricted accounts, but with-
drawals are limited to certain types
of activities, such as education,
homeownership, or business start-
up. As discussed below, state poli-
cies on restricted accounts can be
confusing because similar assets
(e.g., federally versus non-federally
funded IDAs and defined-benefit
versus defined-contribution retire-
ment assets) are treated differently.
While one state had restricted
accounts in 1993, 28 states intro-
duced the accounts by 2003, many 
of which had no asset limits. The
average real limit on assets in these
accounts also increased over time—
from $1,139 in 1993 to $7,683 in 2003
(Nam et al. 2008).
Asset limits in the Food Stamp
Program were liberalized more
slowly. Liquid asset limits remained
unchanged during the 1980s and
1990s (at $3,000 and $2,000 for
households with and without an
elderly member or a member with a
disability, respectively) and were
eroded by inflation. Also, the federal
vehicle asset limit increased by only
$150 (in nominal dollars) during this
period, although the federal govern-
ment allowed a few states to ease
vehicle asset limits via waivers. The
federal government took significant
steps to liberalize FSP asset limits in
2001 and 2002 (Pavetti, Maloy, and
Schott 2002; Super and Dean 2001).
As a result, the number of states 
that allowed the exemption of at
least one vehicle increased dramati-
cally from 3 in 1999 to 30 in 2003
(McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam 2007,
table 4). At the same time, states be-
gan to extend categorical eligibility
for food stamps to units that receive
TANF services. Categorically eligi-
ble households do not have to meet
the asset test, but they must have
net income below the poverty level.
(According to staff at the USDA
Food and Nutrition Service, many
states use this expansion of categori-
cal eligibility as a backdoor way to
ease vehicle asset limits.) By 2003, 
36 states offered categorical eligibil-
ity (Nam et al. 2008).
During the 1990s, federal and
state governments also began to 
adopt IDA programs, which are asset-
building programs targeted at low-
income households (Sherraden 1991,
2001). Recognizing the potential effec-
tiveness of IDA programs (based on
privately funded IDA programs such
as the American Dream Demonstra-
tion project), some states instituted
IDA programs through legislation,
executive orders, or administrative
decisionmaking during the mid-1990s
(Warren and Edwards 2005). State IDA
initiatives were facilitated by subse-
quent federal legislation. By 2003, 24
states had IDA programs that were at
least partially funded by the state gov-
ernment.1 The average program match
rate was roughly 2 dollars for every
dollar saved across the years, while
the average amount that qualified for
a match increased in the early 2000s
and was almost $13,000 in 2003 (Nam
et al. 2008).
Approach
The empirical model uses the varia-
tion across states and in the timing
of different state rules to examine
the relationship between specific
program rules and asset holdings.
We estimate statistical models to
explain six measures of families’
asset holdings: (1) presence of liquid
assets, (2) value of liquid assets, 
(3) vehicle ownership, (4) vehicle
equity, (5) net worth excluding
housing, and (6) net worth including
housing.2 Our models include four
groups of determinants of asset
holdings: (1) state-specific program
rules; (2) family composition and
demographic characteristics (age,
race and ethnicity, educational
attainment [less than high school],
number of children in family, num-
ber of adults in family, and live in
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metropolitan area); (3) state-level
economic characteristics (unemploy-
ment rate, per capita income, and
employment-population ratio); and
(4) state and year fixed-effect, which
capture unobservable differences
across states and across years.3
Individual-level data for the
analysis come from five panels of the
Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP): 1990, 1992, 1993,
1996, and 2001. Each SIPP panel
contains a nationally representative 
(noninstitutional) sample of U.S.
households. When the five panels are
combined, they provide data from
1991 through 2003. One limitation of
the SIPP (and other national surveys)
is that it captures only assets held in
formal transaction accounts, such as
checking or savings accounts. The
SIPP does not, for example, capture
cash held under mattresses. As a re-
sult, this analysis captures the effect
of program rules on assets held in the
formal financial sector. 
The SIPP data are augmented
with state program rules data, which
come from various sources, including
the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules
Database, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Food Stamp Program
State Rules Database, and Center for
Social Development’s and Corpora-
tion for Enterprise Development’s
information on IDA programs.
The analysis examines all low-
education families (those where the
household head has a high school
degree or less education) and low-
education single-mother families. By
focusing on the less educated, the
analysis is limited to disadvantaged
populations most likely to partici-
pate in means-tested programs. 
Low-education single mothers have
the highest likelihood of becoming
welfare participants, while low-
education families represent poten-
tial participants for the Food Stamp
Program and IDA programs.
Findings
What Do Asset Holdings 
Look Like?
Low-education single mothers con-
sistently have fewer assets than 
low-education families in general
(table 1). Among single mothers, only 
33 percent have liquid assets, while
the corresponding statistic for low-
education families is 59 percent.
Further, the average value of liquid
assets held by low-education single
mothers is one-tenth of the value 
held by all low-education families—
$258 versus $2,630, respectively.
Vehicle ownership and equity is also
relatively limited among single moth-
ers. Slightly less than half (48 percent)
of low-education single mothers own
a vehicle. The comparable statistic for
all low-education families is 75 per-
cent. Vehicle equity and net worth 
are also substantially lower for low-
education single mothers than all
low-education families. 
Such levels of asset holding, par-
ticularly among low-education single
mothers, could signal that asset tests
do not affect asset holding. That is, if
single mothers’ asset holdings fall
well below means-tested programs’
asset limits, then increases in those
limits may not lead to higher asset
holdings. Hurst and Ziliak (2006), for
example, conclude that most likely
welfare recipients are not influenced
by increases in asset limits because
most have liquid asset holdings
below the original limits. 
While the data show that poten-
tial welfare recipients hold few
assets, it is still possible that asset
limits built into mean-tested pro-
grams affect asset holdings. Current
and potential welfare recipients may
save at suboptimal levels because
they misunderstand program rules.
In fact, qualitative interviews with
TANF recipients in Virginia and
Maryland suggest that welfare recipi-
ents are misinformed about program
rules and that this misinformation
leads to lower asset holdings
(O’Brien 2006). Most recipients in the
O’Brien study believed that TANF
asset limits were much lower than
the actual limits, and several respon-
dents reported spending down their
bank accounts before applying for
cash assistance. If higher state asset
limits lead to greater community
awareness of the actual value of asset
limits, then increases in asset limits
can lead to increased asset holdings.
Our estimates of the relationship
between state program rules and
families’ assets incorporate how the
rules are understood by families, but
they do not assess how well rules are
understood. 
Even given the likely possibility
that welfare recipients are misin-
formed about program rules, studies
examining the effect of specific pro-
gram rules on asset holdings are still
valuable. They provide information
on how putting a program rule on
the books affects asset holdings. Part
of that effect will reflect how the
rule is implemented and under-
stood.
What Is the Relationship 
between Program Rules 
and Asset Holdings?
Some of the 13 state program rules
have important relationships with
asset holdings. The results presented
in table 2 and described below 
summarize findings from 12 differ-
ent models: six measures of asset
holding estimated across the two
TABLE 1.  Asset Holdings of Low-Education




























Note: All dollar values expressed in year 2000 dollars.
study populations. Results from an
additional specification—measuring
the number of years since the state
program rules were implemented—
are also referenced below but not
shown in table 2. For the full findings
(rather than this summary), see
McKernan and colleagues (2007). 
AFDC/TANF Cash Assistance
Rules: Consistent with the asset test
effect, relaxing unrestricted account
asset limits is associated with in-
creased liquid asset holdings. Using a
measure that captures the number of
years since the unrestricted asset limit
was increased above the AFDC limit
of $1,000, we find a positive relation-
ship (not shown). Each additional
year the unrestricted asset limit was
greater than $1,000 is associated with
a 4 percent increase in liquid asset
holdings. The results, however, are
mixed. Using a current measure of the
actual asset limit dollar value (rather
than the number of years since the
limit was relaxed beyond the AFDC
$1,000 limit), we find no evidence that
unrestricted account asset limits are
linked with liquid asset holdings.
These mixed findings are consistent
with the literature (Hurst and Ziliak
2006; Nam 2008; Sullivan 2006) and
could result because it may take time
for information on program rules to
filter down to participants. The “years
since” model is designed to capture
this time aspect. The results provide
no evidence that unrestricted asset
limits are related to net worth or vehi-
cle assets.
More generous restricted account
asset limits appear to increase liquid
asset holdings, which is consistent
with the fact that restricted accounts
are typically held as liquid assets. For
example, a $10,000 increase in the
restricted account asset limit increases
the amount of liquid assets held by 
15 to 18 percent.4 This finding is con-
sistent with both the asset test and
income effects hypotheses. Restricted
accounts often receive a match for
dollars saved, and the income from
this match could provide an incentive
to increase savings in order to obtain
the match. As expected, we find no
evidence that restricted account asset
limits are related to vehicle asset
holdings. There is some limited evi-
dence that restricted account asset
limits are negatively related to net
worth, which is opposite to what we
originally expected. These net worth
findings may be explained by the fact 
that restricted accounts allow with-
drawals only for certain purposes,
such as education, homeownership,
and business start-up. Investment for
these activities is likely to bring long-
term economic gains but may result
in short-term losses.
The AFDC/TANF vehicle asset
limit and monthly benefit level were
not found to be related to any of the
asset holdings measures. This finding
is consistent with Nam (2008), who
finds no effect of welfare vehicle asset
limits on vehicle asset holdings, but
contrary to Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and
Sullivan (2006), who do find an effect.
Food Stamp Program Rules: The
Food Stamp Program rules had no
statistically significant relationship
with liquid asset holdings. This is 
not a surprise because the FSP rules
examined in this analysis focus on
vehicle asset limits, not liquid asset
limits. 
Families in states with expanded
categorical eligibility have signifi-
cantly higher vehicle equity than
those who live in states without ex-
panded categorical eligibility. As
mentioned above, states use categori-
cal eligibility as a way to ease vehicle
asset limits. The results suggest that
expanded categorical eligibility is
associated with a 27 to 40 percent
increase in vehicle equity. The positive
relationship between expanded cate-
gorical eligibility and vehicle asset
holdings is consistent with the asset
test and income effect hypotheses. 
The results also suggest that vehi-
cle exemptions are related to vehicle
ownership and equity. Exempting at
least one vehicle when determining
Food Stamp eligibility is associated
with a 4 percentage point increase in
vehicle ownership and a 41 percent
increase in vehicle equity. The evi-
dence is mixed on whether these
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TABLE 2.  Statistically Significant Relationships between State Rules and Asset Holding
Relationship with
Liquid Vehicle Net
Program rule variable assets assets worth
AFDC/TANF
(1) Unrestricted asset limit
(2) Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle
(3) Restricted account asset limit (+) (–)
(4) Maximum monthly benefit for family of 3
Food Stamps
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (+) (–)
(2) Expanded categorical eligibility (+) (+)
IDA
(1) Maximum match rate (+)
(2) Maximum amount qualified for match (+) (–)
(3) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients (+)/(–)
Minimum wage and EITC
(1) State EITC (–)
(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable (+)
(3) Minimum wage for FLSA-covered categories (+) (+) (+)
(4) Minimum wage for non-FLSA-covered 
categories
Source: Authors’ analysis of SIPP data.
Note: A “+” represents a positive statistically significant relationship and a “-” represents a negative statistically
significant relationship. No entry in a cell indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship.
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increases in vehicle equity translate
into increased overall net worth. 
IDA Program Rules: Allowing
higher amounts to be matched in
IDA programs is associated with a
small increase in liquid asset hold-
ings for low-education families, 
consistent with the income effect
hypothesis. Increasing the maximum
amount qualified for a match by
$10,000 is associated with a 5 percent
increase in liquid asset holdings.
These findings are corroborated by
the “years since” specification, which
finds that liquid asset holdings
increase 5 percent with each addi-
tional year that a state-sponsored
IDA program is available. We find no
statistically significant relationship
between two other IDA program
rules—match rates and program eli-
gibility beyond welfare recipients—
and liquid asset holdings. Our
findings are consistent with evalua-
tions of the U.S.’s American Dream
Demonstration and the United
Kingdom’s “Saving Gateway” pro-
gram, which found that the match
rate was less important than the max-
imum amount allowed for the match
for increasing savings (Cramer 2007;
Schreiner and Sherraden 2007).
The findings suggest that IDA
program rules are not related to vehi-
cle asset holdings and have a mixed
relationship with net worth. The max-
imum match rate is associated with an
increase in net worth, while the maxi-
mum amount qualified for a match is
weakly associated with a decrease in
net worth. We do find evidence, how-
ever, that who is eligible for an IDA
program matters. Extending eligibility
beyond welfare recipients is related to
a $1,116 reduction in net worth for
single mothers (the most likely wel-
fare recipients) and a $1,548 increase
in net worth for low-education fami-
lies. This might result from IDA pro-
grams with a set amount of funds
having fewer funds to target to the
more disadvantaged welfare popula-
tion when eligibility is broadened.
EITC and Minimum Wage: We find
mixed evidence of the relationship
between the state EITC and liquid
asset holdings. Higher state EITC
amounts are associated with reduced
liquid asset holdings, while the per-
centage of the state EITC that is re-
fundable is associated with increased
liquid asset holdings. Higher EITC
refunds could lead to higher liquid
asset holdings because families have
the option to save all or part of their
tax refund (income effect). On the
other hand, families could save less 
in anticipation of the tax refund (pre-
cautionary savings effect). The results
provide no evidence that the state
EITC is related to either vehicle asset
holdings or net worth. 
Finally, the results provide some
evidence that increases in the mini-
mum wage (for federally covered cat-
egories) is associated with increases
in the liquid assets, vehicle assets,
and net worth held. The results sug-
gest that a $1 increase in the mini-
mum wage is associated with a 
13 percent increase in low-education
families’ liquid asset holdings, an 
11 percent increase in vehicle equity,
and a $895 increase in net worth.
These findings are consistent with the
income effect hypothesis.
Conclusion, Suggestions 
for Future Research, and
Policy Recommendations
In summary, some of the 13 state pro-
gram policies have important relation-
ships with asset holdings. The relevant
findings include the following:
 More generous state AFDC/TANF
restricted asset account limits and
(to a lesser extent) unrestricted
asset account limits are associated
with increased liquid asset hold-
ings. However, AFDC/TANF vehi-
cle exemptions are not associated
with increased asset holdings. 
 More generous state Food Stamp
Program eligibility rules—vehicle
asset limit and expanded categori-
cal eligibility—are associated with
increased vehicle ownership.
 More generous IDA program rules
are associated with increased liq-
uid asset holdings.
 An increase in the minimum wage
(for federally covered categories) is
associated with increases in liquid
assets, vehicle assets, and net worth.
Although some state program
rules and policies—especially those
aimed at asset building—appear 
to affect the asset holdings of less-
educated single mothers and other
less-educated families, not all state
asset-related program rules have 
the same effect. Restrictions on with-
drawals and incentives built into
restricted asset accounts and IDA
programs may provide better motiva-
tion to build assets. Future qualitative
research could shed additional light
on the role that restricted account
limits in means-tested programs play
in asset building. 
IDA research under way contin-
ues to shed light on the role that IDA
programs play in asset building (see
for example Schreiner and Sherraden
2007). We recommend using caution
in interpreting the IDA program rule
results presented here because the
SIPP does not measure IDA program
participation. As a result, the number
of IDA program participants captured
in the data is uncertain and could be
small. The robustness of the IDA pro-
gram findings, however suggest that
IDA programs may be important.
Given the potential for restricted
asset accounts to improve asset hold-
ings (illustrated by our results and
findings in the literature), states could
simplify and make more equitable
program rules related to restricted
asset accounts. State means-tested
policies on restricted asset accounts
are inconsistent, inequitable, and con-
fusing. Similar types of assets are
treated differently. For example, 
savings in federally funded IDA ac-
counts are exempt in some states but
not savings in other similar IDA pro-
grams or college and homeownership
savings programs (Rand 2007). And
only savings in some types of retire-
ment accounts (e.g., defined-benefit
but not defined-contribution) are
exempt in other states (Neuberger,
Greenstein, and Orszag 2006).5 States
could simplify and clarify restricted
asset account rules by exempting
retirement accounts—such as 401(k)
plans and IRAs—as well as other
restricted savings accounts, such as
those for education, homeownership,
and small business ownership.
Findings from the literature and
our analysis suggest that relaxed vehi-
cle asset limits are associated with
increased vehicle ownership. Since
people often need a reliable car to get
to work, further relaxing and simpli-
fying vehicle asset limits—by exempt-
ing at least one vehicle in all states—
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may increase employment and job
stability, and thus improve the well-
being of low-income families. 
Current asset policies are often
confusing for current and potential
participants and likely costly to en-
force. Asset tests vary widely across
government social programs (Chen
and Lerman 2005), contributing to
confusion and administrative costs.
The rules could be clarified and sim-
plified by making them more consis-
tent across means-tested programs,
across states, and across similar asset
types. Asset limits are used, along
with income limits, to target program
benefits. Given other program rules,
asset limits may do little to prevent
the less needy from participating, yet
they make eligibility determinations
more burdensome and costly. We rec-
ognize that the benefits from liberaliz-
ing asset tests may be offset by the
cost of weaker targeting of benefits 
on the most needy. However, the costs
of mistargeted benefits are not well
understood and could be relatively
low, especially compared with the
costs of administering asset tests.
Further research is required to deter-
mine the magnitude of these costs. 
Notes
1. Four criteria are used to define IDA pro-
grams for this analysis: (1) matches savings
when withdrawn for predefined purposes;
(2) is funded at least partially from state gov-
ernment, including those from TANF and
welfare-to-work programs (excludes pro-
grams funded solely by private founda-
tions); (3) is established through state
legislation or administrative rulemaking;
and (4) is actually implemented.
2. The analyses of “presence of liquid assets”
and “vehicle ownership” use linear probabil-
ity models. The “value of liquid assets” and
“vehicle equity” analyses use Tobit models
and are designed to take account of the fact
that a relatively large fraction of families in
our sample does not hold liquid assets (41 to
67 percent) or own a vehicle (25 to 52 per-
cent). The analyses of net worth are based on
weighted ordinary least squares models.
3. For more information about the empirical
approach, see McKernan and colleagues
(2007).
4. A $10,000 increase may seem large to con-
sider, but it reflects the variation in state pol-
icy; more than half the states that adopted
restricted account asset limits set their limit
at $10,000 or higher (Rowe and Versteeg
2005, 120–21). If only a small fraction of the
low-income (education) population has the
option of joining an IDA program or hold-
ing another type of restricted asset account,
then the true magnitude of this relationship
for families may be larger than what we
capture here. Results from the additional
specification measuring the years since the
state made restricted account asset limits
available find a very small positive, but not
statistically significant, relationship with
liquid asset holdings.
5. Liabilities are not typically considered in
asset tests, further contributing to inequity,
though counting liabilities could increase
administrative burdens and further compli-
cate the rules. 
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